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Abstract—A Coordination Blockchain is a blockchain with the
task of coordinating activities of multiple private blockchains.
This paper discusses the pros and cons of using Ethereum
MainNet, the public Ethereum blockchain, as a Coordination
Blockchain. The requirements Ethereum MainNet needs to fulfil
to perform this role are discussed within the context of Ethereum
Private Sidechains, a private blockchain technology which allows
many blockchains to be operated in parallel, and allows atomic
crosschain transactions to execute across blockchains. Ethereum
MainNet is a permissionless network which aims to offer
strong authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation properties,
that incentivises good behaviour using crypto economics. This
paper demonstrates that Ethereum MainNet does deliver these
properties. It then provides a comprehensive review of the
features of Ethereum Private Sidechains, with a focus on the
potential usage of Coordination Blockchains for these features.
Finally, the merits of using Ethereum MainNet as a Coordination
Blockchain are assessed. For Ethereum Private Sidechains, we
found that Ethereum MainNet is best suited to storing long term
static data that needs to be widely available, such as the Ethereum
Registration Authority information. However, due to Ethereum
MainNet’s probabilistic finality, it is not well suited to information
that needs to be available and acted upon immediately, such as the
Sidechain Public Keys and Atomic Crosschain Transaction state
information that need to be accessible prior to the first atomic
crosschain transaction being issued on a sidechain. Although this
paper examined the use of Ethereum MainNet as a Coordination
Blockchain within reference to Ethereum Private Sidechains, the
discussions and observations of the typical tasks a Coordination
blockchain may be expected to perform are applicable more
widely to any multi-blockchain system.
Index Terms—blockchain, mainnet, private, ethereum,
sidechain, coordination
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper analyses the advantages and disadvantages of
using Ethereum MainNet as a Coordination Blockchain, by
demonstrating the ways in which a Coordination Blockchain
may be leveraged in a blockchain network that runs several
parallel blockchains. We conduct an in-depth review of the
features of Ethereum Private Sidechains, which is an exam-
ple of such a blockchain system, to explore their potential
usage of Coordination Blockchains as an exposition of using
Coordination Blockchains more generally. The analysis builds
on the Symposium on Distributed Ledger Technology paper
Future of Blockchain [1], and other work on Ethereum Pri-
vate Sidechains including: Requirements for Ethereum Private
Sidechains [2], Ethereum Registration Authorities [3], Anony-
mous Pinning [4], and Atomic Crosschain Transactions [5].
Ethereum MainNet is the largest public deployment of the
Ethereum platform. It is a permissionless network, allowing
any node to join the network. It is said to offer good authen-
ticity, integrity, and non-repudiation properties, along with an
economic system to discourage transaction spamming [6], [7].
To date there has been no work that has analysed all of these
assertions. This paper remedies this deficiency by carefully
analysing whether these properties are successfully delivered.
Sidechains are blockchains that rely on a separate
blockchain, a Coordination Blockchain, for their overall utility.
This could be to enhance security by pinning the state of the
sidechain to the Coordination Blockchain [4], for addressing
information [3], or for storing data that is used across all
sidechains. We analyse the appropriateness of using Ethereum
MainNet as a Coordination Blockchain for the various fea-
tures of sidechains, using as a reference Ethereum Private
Sidechains.
This paper is organised as follows: the Background sec-
tion briefly introduces Ethereum MainNet, the platform that
forms the basis for this paper. We describe the concept of
private blockchains and the enterprise version of Ethereum,
and introduce the concept of block ‘finality’. Next crypt-
analysis of message digest and asymmetric algorithms is
reviewed given classical and quantum cryptanalytical tech-
niques. The Ethereum MainNet Features section analyses
whether Ethereum MainNet delivers authenticity, integrity,
non-repudiation, and crypto-economic anti-spam properties.
The Ethereum Private Sidechains section describes the fea-
tures of Ethereum Private Sidechains and their usage of Coor-
dination Blockchains. The Pros and Cons of using Ethereum
MainNet as a Coordination Blockchain section analyses the
advantages and disadvantages of using Ethereum MainNet as
the Coordination Blockchain for each of the Ethereum Private
Sidechain features.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Ethereum
1) Ethereum MainNet: Ethereum [8] is a blockchain plat-
form that allows users to upload and execute computer pro-
grams known as Smart Contracts. Ethereum Smart Contracts
can be written in a variety of Turing Complete languages,
the most popular being Solidity [9]. Source code is compiled
into a bytecode representation. The bytecode can then be
deployed using a contract creation transaction. Contracts have
a special constructor function that only runs when the contract
creation transaction is being processed. This function is used
to initialize memory and call other contract code. Miners
execute the bytecode inside the Ethereum Virtual Machine
(EVM). At present, each miner must execute all transactions
for all contracts and hold the current value of all the memory
associated with all of the contracts. The Ethereum community
is actively working on methodologies to scale the Ethereum
network by sharding the blockchain [10].
Ethereum transactions update the state of the distributed
ledger but do not return values. They fall into three categories:
Ether transfer, contract creation, and calling a function on a
contract. Ether transfer transactions move Ether from the user’s
account to another account. Contract creation transactions put
code into the distributed ledger and call the constructor of the
contract code, setting the contract data’s initial state. Function
call transactions call a function on a contract and result in
updated state. Contract creation and function call transactions
also allow Ether to be transferred. All types of transactions
must be signed by a private key corresponding to an account
and include a nonce value that prevents replay attacks. In
addition to Ethereum transactions, “View” function calls can
be executed on the Smart Contract code. These View function
calls return a value and do not update the state of the Smart
Contract.
Executing code and accessing resources, such as memory,
costs certain amounts of “Gas”. The “Gas Cost” of executing
code is closely tied to the real world cost of executing each
type of instruction. Miners preferentially mine transactions that
are prepared to pay a higher “Gas Price”. Accounts instigating
transactions specify the “Gas Price” they are prepared to pay
for their transaction and specify the maximum amount of gas
a transaction can use known as “Start Gas”. This commits
an account holder to paying up to a certain amount of Ether
for the transaction. Any unused gas is returned to the account
holder at the end of the transaction. Transactions that run out
of gas prior to completion are aborted, with all of the gas
being expended.
In the Ethereum public network, “MainNet”, all contract
code and data are readable by any user of any node that
connects to the network. Smart Contracts on Ethereum Main-
Net can only perform permissioning in contract code, limiting
which accounts can update the state of a contract. However,
there is no mechanism to limit which users can read contract
code and data.
2) Private Blockchains and Enterprise Ethereum: Private
blockchains are blockchain networks that are established be-
tween nodes operated by enterprises [2]. Only permissioned
nodes belonging to participating enterprises are allowed to join
the private blockchain’s peer-to-peer network and only per-
missioned accounts belonging to participating enterprises are
allowed to submit transactions to the nodes. These blockchains
provide the privacy and permissioning required by enterprises
[11].
The need for security and permissioning features over and
above what is available in standard Ethereum [11] has led to
a range of platforms being developed. J.P. Morgan developed
Quorum [12], a fork of the Golang Ethereum implementation
called Geth [13]. ConsenSys’s Protocol Engineering Group,
PegaSys created Pantheon [14], an Ethereum MainNet com-
patible client that aims to meet the permissioning and privacy
requirements of the Enterprise Ethereum Client Specification
[11]. Hyperledger Fabric [15] is a distributed ledger platform
originally created by IBM and now hosted by The Linux
Foundation. Similar to Quorum and Pantheon, the platform
offers privacy and permissioning features. Whereas Quorum
offers Ethereum based private transactions, Pantheon offers
private smart contracts that are private to a set of participants.
Hyperledger Fabric offers the ability to host one or more
smart contracts on a private blockchain called a “channel”.
Hyperledger Fabric allows multiple channels to be operated on
the one network, thus allowing for multiple sets of private con-
tracts between different sets of participants to operate on the
one network. An analysis of the merits of Hyperledger Fabric
and Quorum has been analysed elsewhere (see Requirements
for Ethereum Private Sidechains [2]).
3) Finality: A block is deemed final when it can no longer
be changed. All transactions contained within a finalised block
are also deemed final.
Ethereum transactions are included in blocks. An Ethereum
MainNet miner that solves the Proof of Work cryptographic
puzzle can add a block to the end of the blockchain. If two
or more miners solve the puzzle simultaneously, then two or
more chains are created with common ancestors, and this is
known as a fork [16]. In Bitcoin the longest chain of blocks
is deemed to be the valid blockchain [17], [18]. In Ethereum,
the fork choice is solved by means of a modified Greediest
Heaviest Observed Subtree (GHOST) protocol [16] that takes
into account the mining power in creating blocks that have
links to the main chain, but have become stale [19]. These
blocks are commonly referred to as uncle blocks. The weight
of a block relates to the number of previous blocks in the chain
and uncle blocks. The heaviest chain of blocks is deemed to be
the valid blockchain. If an Ethereum MainNet miner becomes
aware of a heavier chain than it knew about, it should then
only attempt to add blocks to the new chain. Blocks on the old
heaviest chain that are not in common with the new longest
chain are deemed reordered. If none of the transactions in
a reordered block have been included in the blocks of the
new longest chain, then the block can be included as an uncle
block. Otherwise, the transactions that are not included in the
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Fig. 1. Pinning
reordered chain need to be included in a new block. There is
no certainty that these transactions will be included in a new
block, or that transactions in a proposed uncle block will be
included in the blockchain.
As more blocks are added to the end of Ethereum Main-
Net’s blockchain, the probability of a miner finding a longer
blockchain and reordering the blockchain is reduced [16]. This
is because a miner would need to repeatedly solve the Proof
of Work cryptographic puzzle for each block faster than all
other miners. As the probability of a block being reordered
is reduced, the probability of the transactions included in a
block being final increases. Hence, Ethereum MainNet is said
to have, probabilistic finality [18].
Consensus algorithms such as Istanbul Fault Byzantine
Tolerant (IBFT) [20] and Istanbul Fault Byzantine Tolerant
version 2 (IBFT2) [21] used in consortium blockchains give
instant finality, where once a transaction has been included in
a block minted by a validator, it can no longer be changed.
4) Pinning: The state of a blockchain or sidechain can be
represented by the Block Hash of a block. The Block Hash of a
final block could be submitted to a contract on a Coordination
Blockchain at regular intervals [4], as shown in Figure 1.
This process is know as pinning. Regularly pinning sidechain
state helps to protect minority sidechain participants from
state reversion due to collusion by the majority of sidechain
participants [4].
B. Cryptanalysis
This section provides background material on cryptanalysis
that is needed to understand the analysis of the security
properties of Ethereum MainNet.
1) Message Digest Algorithm Cryptanalysis: Message di-
gest algorithms have three main security properties: Preim-
age Resistance, Second Preimage Resistance, and Collision
Resistance. Message digest algorithms are commonly called
Cryptographic Hash algorithms, or simply Hash algorithms.
Given a Hash algorithm h, the three security properties can be
stated as:
• Preimage Resistance: Given y, it is difficult to determine
x such that y = h(x).
• Second Preimage Resistance: Given y and x1, it is
difficult to determine x2 such that y = h(x1) = h(x2)
and x1 6= x2.
• Collision Resistance: It is difficult to determine x1 and
x2 such that h(x1) = h(x2) and x1 6= x2.
2) Classical Computing Cryptanalysis: Gordon Moore, co-
founder of Intel, stated in his ”Moore’s Law” that the number
of transistors on an integrated circuit doubles approximately
every two years [22]. With the increased number of transistors
has come a decrease in transistor size, which has resulted in
decreased power consumption per transistor. This has resulted
in an increase in computation power, while keeping the power
consumption relative static over a fifty year period. This rate
of increase of computation power and decrease of transistor
size though slowing, is still continuing [23]. Additionally, new
alternative approaches are being developed to deliver increased
computational power [24].
Classical computational power can be used to break algo-
rithms such as message digest algorithms by trying all possible
combinations using a “Brute Force” attack. Complexity theory
predicts how many attempts are likely to be needed to break
an algorithm. For message digest algorithms, using classical
computing power, the complexity of breaking an algorithm’s
Preimage Resistance or Second Preimage Resistance property
is O(N), where N is the number of combinations of the digest
output, whereas the complexity of breaking an algorithms
Collision Resistance is O(
√
N).
The USA’s National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) defines Security Strength [25] as, “A number associated
with the amount of work (that is, the number of operations)
that is required to break a cryptographic algorithm or system.”
Security Strength and complexity are related. The Security
Strength of a message digest algorithm’s Preimage and Second
Preimage Resistance properties is log2N and the Collision
Resistance Security Strength is log2
√
N . Recall that log2N
corresponds to the message digest output length in bits. As
such, the algorithm SHA-256’s Preimage and Second Preim-
age Security Strength is 256-bits and its Collision Resistance
Security Strength is 128 bits, assuming classical computers
[25].
In some instances, a message digest output is truncated.
For example in Ethereum, Keccak-256 is used to generate
account numbers with the output truncated from 256-bits to
160-bits. In this usage, the analysis of Security Strength re-
mains unchanged: the complexity and hence Security Strength
relates to the number of possible values of the digest output. If
a message digest output is truncated then the Security Strength
of the overall algorithm is proportionally reduced.
NIST defines algorithms with Security Strengths of 80, 112,
128, 192, and 256 bits [26]. NIST have mandated the phasing
out of 80-bit Security Strength algorithms in 2010 and, based
on Moore’s Law, had indicated the phasing out of 112-bit
Security Strength algorithms by 2030.
3) Quantum Computing Cryptanalysis: Quantum comput-
ers are expected to allow all currently used popular asymmetric
cryptographic algorithms to be defeated and are expected to
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reduce the Security Strength of message digest and symmetric
cipher cryptographic algorithms [27]. Aggarwal et al. [28]
estimate that ECC 256-bit schemes will be able to be compro-
mised with a Quantum computer using the Shor algorithm [29]
in less than ten minutes sometime between 2027 and 2040.
Grover’s algorithm [30] provides a speedup for database
search style algorithms, such as searching for a message digest
preimage or second preimage. Using Grover’s algorithm the
complexity of message digest algorithm’s Preimage or Second
Preimage Resistance properties are reduced from O(N) to
O(
√
N). This means that the Security Strength assuming a
sufficiently powerful quantum computer is half that when
compared to the Security Strength due to classical computing
power.
Brassard and Tapp [31] claimed to have developed an
algorithm for use with quantum computers that reduces the
complexity of finding message digest collisions to O( 3
√
N).
Bernstein [32] has refuted this claim, stating that there is
no real advantage provided by Brassard and Tapp’s algorithm
given the cost - performance analysis over classical computing
power. However, Aaronson and Shi [33] have determined a
tight lower bound for the complexity of the collision problem
as O( 3
√
N). As such, despite Bernstein’s refutation of Brassard
and Tapp’s algorithm, it can be conjectured that another
algorithm may be found that meets the theoretical bound, that
has a better cost - performance metric.
Despite the reduced Security Strength offered by message
digest algorithms, assuming a quantum computer, they are
unlikely to be a point of weakness in the near term. Developing
a complex quantum computer that can defeat message digest
algorithms is expected to be significantly more complex than
developing one to defeat ECC 256-bit [34]. As such, it is likely
that a quantum computer that can be used to attack message
digest algorithms will not be available until at least the 2030s.
4) Algorithmic Weaknesses: Researchers search for weak-
nesses in algorithms. These weaknesses when found can
reduce the effective Security Strength offered by the algorithm.
For example various weakness have been found in the MD-5
message digest algorithm [35] [36]. It is impossible to predict
if a weakness in an algorithm such as Keccak-256 will be
found, and the degree to which the algorithm would be weak-
ened with such a compromise. Algorithmic weaknesses will
not be considered in the analysis of Ethereum MainNet given
the uncertainty as to whether such weakness will be found,
when they will be found, and the impact such weaknesses
might have.
III. ETHEREUM MAINNET FEATURES
This section discusses in detail the features of Ethereum
MainNet that are important to its usage as a Coordination
Blockchain.
A. Authentication
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) define
authentication in X.805 [37] as:
...serves to confirm the identities of communicat-
ing entities. Authentication ensures the validity of
the claimed identities of the entities participating
in communication (e.g., person, device, service or
application) and provides assurance that an entity is
not attempting a masquerade or unauthorized replay
of a previous communication.
In the context of Ethereum, this means ensuring Ethereum
transactions are directly attributable to participants who oper-
ate Ethereum Accounts.
Ethereum transactions are signed using the private key
belonging to a participant [8]. The public key associated with
the private key can be derived from the transaction signature of
any transaction signed by the private key. The account number
is the twenty-byte truncated Keccak-256 message digest of
the public key.
In Ethereum, each transaction includes a nonce [8]. The
initial nonce value for each account is zero. The nonce is
incremented for each successfully mined transaction. Miners
reject transactions with out of order or repeated nonces. Doing
this protects Ethereum from transaction replay attacks.
The nonce value is represented as a 64-bit signed number
in Geth [13] and Pantheon [14]. Adding one to the maximum
representable number would result in the largest negative
number. If this situation was not guarded against in the code,
it would lead to unexpected results, and possibly an authen-
tication failure. However, 63-bits is large enough such that
even if a single account issued every transaction on Ethereum
MainNet, and could craft sufficiently small transactions and
could have the gas limit increased such that they could execute
1000 transactions per second, the nonce value would not wrap
around for 584 million years.
Ethereum private keys are 256-bits long. The signature
algorithm ECDSA / Keccak-256 using the secp256k1
curve is used for signing transactions. The secp256k1 curve
has been analysed and found to not have any weaknesses
[38]. This signature algorithm provides 128-bits of Security
Strength [26] assuming Classical Cryptanalysis. The conver-
sion of the public key to an account number using a twenty-
byte truncated Keccak-256 message digest offers 160-bits
of Security Strength assuming Classical Cryptanalysis, as an
attacker would need to exploit the Second Preimage Resistance
property of the message digest function to determine another
public key which could hash to the same value as the authentic
public key. As such, overall the Ethereum signing mechanism
provides 128-bits of Security Strength assuming Classical
Cryptanalysis.
NIST has issued guidance that usage of algorithms offer-
ing 112-bit Security Strength assuming Classical Cryptanal-
ysis should be phased out by 2030 [25]. This means that
Ethereum’s transaction signing technique should be secure
well beyond 2030, assuming Classical Cryptanalysis, given
its 128-bit Security Strength.
If an attacker had access to a sufficiently powerful Quantum
Computer, they could determine private keys associated with
the public keys. The attacker could observe transactions that
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have been submitted and determine the public keys associ-
ated with each transaction using the standard ecrecover
technique [8]. Once an attacker had access to a private key,
they could issue arbitrary transactions using that private key.
Aggarwal’s [28] analysis indicates that the authenticity of
transactions may be able to be compromised in this way some
time after 2027.
The Ethereum community have recognised the threat that
Quantum Cryptanalysis poses to Ethereum transaction signing.
There are plans to roll-out “Account Security Abstraction”
changes that will authenticate transactions programmatically
using user supplied code [39] [40] [41]. This would allow
for users to choose to use Quantum Cryptanalysis resistant
algorithms.
In summary, the existing transaction authentication tech-
niques are likely to be secure until at least 2027. Prior to
2027, Ethereum is likely to be upgraded to mitigate the
threat of quantum computers, thus ensuring the authenticity
of transactions into the future.
B. Integrity
ITU defines data integrity [37] as:
... ensures the correctness or accuracy of data. The
data is protected against unauthorized modification,
deletion, creation, and replication and provides an
indication of these unauthorized activities.
In the context of Ethereum, this means ensuring that authenti-
cated transactions and data in the distributed ledger are stored
such that they can not be modified.
Ethereum transactions are combined into blocks using
Merkle Patricia trees [8]. Similarly, data in the distributed
ledger is protected using Merkle Patricia trees. Compromising
values in the Merkle Particia trees would require breaking the
Second Preimage Resistance property of Keccak-256. This
is unlikely to occur in foreseeable future using either Quan-
tum or Classical Cryptanalysis techniques. However, there is
always the possibility that a weakness in Keccak-256 will
be found.
C. Non-Repudiation
ITU defines non-repudiation [37] as:
...provides means for preventing an individual or
entity from denying having performed a particular
action related to data by making available proof
of various network-related actions (such as proof
of obligation, intent, or commitment; proof of data
origin, proof of ownership, proof of resource use).
It ensures the availability of evidence that can be
presented to a third party and used to prove that
some kind of event or action has taken place.
In the context of Ethereum, this means ensuring that authenti-
cated transactions are stored such that they can not be revoked.
Ethereum blocks are linked together using Keccak-256
message digests. Compromising this linkage would require
breaking the Preimage Resistance property of Keccak-256,
which is unlikely to occur in foreseeable future.
As discussed in Section II-A3, Finality, Ethereum Main-
Net has probabilistic finality. When blocks are added to
the blockchain after a block containing a transaction, the
probability of a miner proposing a heavier chain that does
not include the block decreases. The number of blocks added
after a block is known as the number of block confirmations.
Nakamoto [17] showed the probability of a Bitcoin block
being removed after six blocks, assuming an attacker has 10%
of the mining power was 0.00024. A greater number of block
confirmations should be observed if an attacker were assumed
to have a greater percentage of the total mining power available
to them, or if the user wished to have greater certainty that
the block was not going to be removed.
In 2016, Gervais [42] determined that 37 Ethereum MainNet
block confirmations were needed to offer the same level of se-
curity as six Bitcoin block confirmations, assuming Ethereum
was being attacked with 30% of mining power. Since 2016, the
mining power devoted to Ethereum has increased considerably
such that a 30% attack now seems inconceivable. Major miners
are unlikely to attack their own network as this would risk
devaluing the cryptocurrency they are mining [43], [44]. The
maximum hash power which can be rented in a straightforward
way is 5% [45]. Purchasing hardware to generate 30% hash
power (174TH/s [46]) would cost in excess of US$400 million
[47].
Scaling the results of Gervais’s work [42] based on the
changed mining rewards of Bitcoin and Ethereum, the changed
valuations, and allowing for a 10% mining power attack,
indicates that eight Ethereum block confirmations corresponds
to six Bitcoin confirmations. Using a different methodology,
Buterin [48] determined that six to twelve confirmations where
required to deem a transaction final, depending on the level of
risk a user was prepared to assume.
Based on a fourteen second target block time and assuming
twelve confirmations, a block on Ethereum MainNet could
be deemed final in approximately three minutes. The finality
time is not a precise number as the block time is randomly
distributed with an average of fourteen seconds.
When Ethereum MainNet client vendors and miners agree
to changes in the Ethereum protocol, the system is updated
via changes known as Hard Forks. A Hard Fork requires all
Ethereum MainNet client vendors to release updated software
which will activate new functionality at a certain Ethereum
MainNet block number. For the Spurious Dragon Hard Fork
in November 2016 [49] the changes were implemented slightly
differently. This resulted in the Ethereum MainNet blockchain
forking for some hours [50]. The fork is resolved once the
vendors software has been corrected. However, it is possible
that a transaction which was part of a block accepted into the
fork which was discarded was reverted and not resubmitted to
the blockchain. This type of forking and state reversion due
to mismatched feature implementation is much less likely to
occur now and in the future than it did in 2016 as Ethereum
MainNet clients undergo significantly more review and testing
than they did in 2016 [51], [52].
If an attacker could dedicate 51% of the total mining power
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to attacking the network, they would be able to mount a
51% Attack [53]. This would allow the attacker to rewrite the
history of the blockchain. The three largest Ethereum MainNet
miners could collude to mount such as attack. However, these
miners are disincentivized to do such an attack as this would
adversely affect confidence in Ethereum MainNet. This would
lead to a dramatic drop in the value of Ether [43], [44],
substantially decreasing the value of their Ether and their
Ethereum infrastructure investments.
Though the Ethereum MainNet system typically can not be
modified, after a re-entrancy bug was exploited in the DAO
attack [54], the system was modified to reverse the results
of the attack. Doing this caused some to question trust in
blockchain systems and Ethereum MainNet in particular [55].
However, this type of irregular state change [56] to reverse
the results of such an attack appear unlikely to occur again
in Ethereum MainNet. Despite a bug in the Parity Wallet
contract that resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars of
funds becoming inaccessible, proposals to alter history to
restore the funds have been refused [57] [58].
D. Crypto Economic Anti-Spam
As described in Section II-A1, each transaction on Ethereum
MainNet costs Gas to execute, which participants pay for
with Ether. Ethereum MainNet currently aims to produce new
blocks each 14 seconds with eight million Gas available for
each block [46]. Each transaction has as a minimum cost,
the transaction fee, that is currently 21,000 Gas. Simple
balance transfers between accounts just cost the transaction
fee, whereas complex function calls can cost more than a
million gas. As the block gas limit is eight million, it means
that no transaction can use more than eight million gas.
This translates to Ethereum MainNet supporting between four
transactions per minute and twenty-seven transactions per
second. A typical simple transaction, adding a Pin to a pinning
contract, costs 64972 Gas [4]. Given the eight million Gas
limit, 8.8 of these transactions could execute per second.
Participants are disincentivized from flooding the network
with transactions as each transaction has an economic cost.
The cost of Gas depends on the block utilisation [59]. His-
torically, the Gas price has spiked high when block utilisation
has been high [60]. If many entities attempted to issue adding
a Pin to a pinning contract transactions regularly, such that
the block utilisation was high, then the cost of issuing the
adding a Pin to a pinning contract transactions would increase.
This would incentivise the entities to find alternatives, such as
reducing the frequency of submitting the transactions.
E. Summary
Based on the analysis in this section, it can be said that
Ethereum MainNet contains transactions for which the authen-
ticity and integrity is certain. Once twelve blocks have been
appended to the block containing a transaction, the probability
of the blockchain being reorganised such that the transaction
is reverted is small. As such, Ethereum MainNet offers strong
non-repudiation properties. Ethereum’s Gas mechanism oper-
ates as an effective anti-spam tool.
IV. ETHEREUM PRIVATE SIDECHAINS
Ethereum Private Sidechains are Ephemeral, On-demand,
Permissioned, Private, Confidential, blockchains that allow for
Atomic Crosschain Transactions. They are Ephemeral in that
they are created, they operate, and then they can be archived
when they are no longer needed. Their On-demand nature
allows them to be created when needed between parties that
have no prior relationship. Permissioning ensures that only
authorised nodes are able to join a sidechain. Their design is
such that to the greatest extent possible, their membership and
their transactions are kept Private. Confidentiality is ensured
by encrypting the sidechain data when being communicated
between nodes and stored on nodes. Atomic Crosschain Trans-
actions enable transactions that update state across sidechains
atomically.
Ethereum Private Sidechains have been described in terms
of their requirements [2], and aspects of their technology [3],
[4], [5]. This paper is the first to present this technology holis-
tically. Additionally, this paper introduces the idea of pinning
the final state of a sidechain prior to archiving, thus allowing
the sidechain to be reinstated if needed, and introduces the
idea of using Ethereum MainNet gas pricing as a mechanism
for rate control of Atomic Crosschain Transactions.
A. Ephemeral
Ethereum Private Sidechains are Ephemeral: they are cre-
ated, they are used for a period, and then archived when they
are no longer required. This limited lifespan matches many
real world requirements, such as Letters of Credit and other
business deals, which have a limited lifespan. The ability
to archive the blockchain data in a sidechain is in contrast
to existing blockchain technologies that are designed to be
operational indefinitely.
The life span of a sidechain could vary widely. For us-
ages in which sidechains are used to deploy a contract and
automatically negotiate a deal, it might only be needed for
some minutes, hours or days. Other usages, such as an Oracle,
require a long or indefinite lifespan. Indefinite lifespans can
be accommodated by never archiving the sidechain.
While a sidechain is operational, the sidechain could be
pinned to a Coordination Blockchain at regular intervals [4].
Regularly pinning sidechain state helps to protect minority
sidechain participants from state reversion due to collusion by
the majority of sidechain participants [4].
A key aspect of Ephemeral sidechains is the requirement
to be able to restart the sidechain after archiving. This can
be achieved by pinning the last block of the sidechain to a
Coordination Blockchain. Now that the Block Hash of the last
block has been securely stored in the Coordination Blockchain,
the state of the sidechain can then be stored offline. To restart
the sidechain, the stored data is compared against the final
Block Hash to confirm the correct state is being used to restart
the sidechain.
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B. On-demand Between Parties with No Prior Relationship
Ethereum Private Sidechains need to be able to be deployed
between parties that have no prior relationship. That is, the
parties need to be able to establish a sidechain without
knowing each others’ node IP addresses, cryptographic keys,
or other information required to set-up a secure connection.
Establishing sidechains in this dynamic way is in contrast
to existing permissioned blockchains that are largely static
systems that require complex set-up. For example, set-up of a
Quorum [12] network requires enode addresses (IP addresses
and Ethereum account numbers) for each node to be shared out
of band with all other nodes. Adding new nodes to the network
requires this sharing and manual intervention on each node.
The on-demand sidechain establishment is analogous to
a user of a web browser establishing a secure connection
with a web server by simply entering in a URL such as
https://example.com/. The user does not know the IP address of
the computer corresponding to example.com or the public key
that can be used to verify the communications emanating from
example.com. However, using the domain name, some initial
trust, and the Domain Name Service (DNS) and Transport
Layer Security (TLS) protocols, they are able to establish
a secure connection. Similarly, Ethereum Private Sidechains
need to be able to establish a secure sidechain using just
domain names.
The Ethereum Registration Authorities system is a set of
smart contracts that can be used to provide discoverable
information to enable establishment of sidechains between
organisations with no prior relationship [3]. A Coordination
Blockchain could be used to locate the information using
domain names that can be grouped according to differ-
ent trust levels and different trust relationships. Moreover,
a Coordination Blockchain that provides organisations with
a secure, decentralized, censorship-resistant mechanism for
storing information that can be located using domain names
and grouped according to different trust levels and different
trust relationships would overcome the limitations of previous
technologies that did not provide the security and censorship
resistance properties that users of blockchain technologies
expect.
C. Permissioned
Ethereum Private Sidechains need to be operated by au-
thorised nodes using authorised Ethereum accounts. These
requirements match those of the Enterprise Ethereum Client
Specification [11]. The implementation of these requirements
do not use a Coordination Blockchain.
D. Private
Ethereum Private Sidechains should, to the greatest extent
possible, keep their membership private from other sidechains
they interact with and from any Coordination Blockchains they
use to facilitate their actions.
E. Confidential
Ethereum Private Sidechains should encrypt their
blockchain and state data such that the transaction information
is kept confidential, both when it is communicated between
nodes on a sidechain and when it is stored in a node’s local
data store. The implementation of this feature does not use a
Coordination Blockchain.
F. Atomic Crosschain Transactions
Ethereum Private Sidechains technology needs to enable
transactions that update state across sidechains atomically
[5]. That is, if an Atomic Crosschain Transaction is across
sidechains A, B, and C, then the state updates related to
the transaction are either applied on all sidechains or ignored
on all sidechains. A Coordination Blockchain holds a Cross-
chain Coordination Contract. This contract is used to indicate
that an Atomic Crosschain Transaction has commenced, has
been committed, or should be ignored. The contract acts as
a common time-out reference for all sidechains and helps
prevent denial of service attacks. The data in the Crosschain
Coordination Contract needs to be available until the last
sidechain using it has been archived.
The Atomic Crosschain Transaction system uses threshold
signatures to prove values across sidechains. The public key
that corresponds to the private key shares held by each of the
sidechain validators is known as a Sidechain Public Key. This
key needs to be available to all sidechains that need to verify
values coming from a sidechain. As such, this value should
be stored on a Coordination Blockchain. The Sidechain Public
Key needs to be re-generated and uploaded to the Coordination
Blockchain each time a validator is added or removed from
the sidechain. Assuming that sidechain membership is largely
static, this regeneration and upload is likely to be a rare event.
V. PROS AND CONS OF USING ETHEREUM MAINNET AS A
COORDINATION BLOCKCHAIN
The subsections below analyse the advantages and dis-
advantages of using Ethereum MainNet as the Coordina-
tion Blockchain for the operations of an Ethereum Private
Sidechain. The findings of the subsections are summarised in
Table I.
A. Private Node Discovery - Ethereum Registration Authori-
ties
The Ethereum Registration Authorities system [3] uses
smart contracts on a Coordination Blockchain to enable
discovery of sidechain node address and cryptographic key
information, as described in Section IV-B. As the information
is used to bootstrap a sidechain, it is fundamental to the entire
Ethereum Private Sidechain system that this information is
authentic.
The data in the Ethereum Registration Authority smart
contracts is largely static. That is, the IP address and crypto-
graphic key information, once set, changes rarely. Given this
largely static data, the economic cost of storing information on
Ethereum MainNet would only be incurred rarely. It is likely to
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Operation Advantages Disadvantages
Discover using Ethereum Good authenticity, integrity, and
Registration Authorities non-repudiation properties.
Permissionless, public network,
enables discovery.
State Pinning & Good authenticity, integrity, and Economic cost.
Final State Pinning non-repudiation properties. Increased congestion on
Ethereum MainNet.
Pinning and disputes are
public.
State Pinning & Leverage Ethereum MainNet Pins take more time to become
Final State Pinning security properties while final on Ethereum MainNet
via an intermediate minimising cost and congestion. than if pinned directly.
private blockchain Pinning and disputes are not Sidechain participants must
public. observe all levels of pinning.
Sidechain Public Key Public keys widely available. Significantly delays when first
Atomic Crosschain
Transactions can be issued.
Atomic Crosschain Leverages Ethereum MainNet Significantly delays when first
Transaction State anti-spam capabilities. Atomic Crosschain
Transactions can be issued.
Economic gas cost.
Increased congestion on
Ethereum MainNet.
TABLE I
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF USING ETHEREUM MAINNET AT COORDINATION BLOCKCHAIN FOR ETHEREUM PRIVATE SIDECHAINS
cost less that US$1.00 to set-up an enterprise in the Ethereum
Registration Authority system on Ethereum MainNet, based
on current prices [3].
Sidechain users who wish to establish a sidechain need to
be able to access the bootstrap information stored in Ethereum
Registration Authority smart contracts for the system to be
useful. The information needs to be stored on a permissionless
network or a permissioned network that has a black list of
banned nodes. Doing this allows users who have no prior
relationship with the operators of the Coordination Blockchain
to access the information.
B. State Pinning
A private blockchain state pinning approach should be
used to prevent state reversion as described in Section IV-B.
Posting Pins to Ethereum MainNet leverages the authenticity,
integrity and non-repudiation properties of Ethereum MainNet.
However, submitting transactions costs money. Pinning once
per hour for a year would cost US$508 [4]. Additionally, if
many sidechains pinned to Ethereum MainNet simultaneously,
it would cause transaction congestion. Another issue with
pinning directly to Ethereum MainNet is that any disputes
that occur would need to occur on Ethereum MainNet, thus
making the participant list of the sidechain public.
Pins could be posted directly to a smart contract on
Ethereum MainNet, or could be posted via a smart contract
on an intermediate blockchain using a hierarchical pinning
approach [4]. Using a hierarchical pinning approach, many
private blockchains could treat another private blockchain
as a Coordination Blockchain posting Pins to it. This pri-
vate blockchain could in turn post Pins to another private
blockchain or to Ethereum MainNet. This is shown diagram-
matically in Figure 2. Pinning to a hierarchy of Coordination
Fig. 2. Hierarchical Pinning
Blockchains in this way means that only a small number of
Pins on Ethereum MainNet could be used to secure a large
number of private blockchains. The cost of submitting Pins to
the private blockchain could be either free or significantly less
than Ethereum MainNet.
A benefit of pinning directly to Ethereum MainNet, rather
than via an intermediate blockchain, is that the pinned state
becomes final faster. That is, if a Pin is posted to a pri-
vate blockchain, whose state is in turn pinned to Ethereum
MainNet, then the sidechain Pin could be deemed to become
final only once the private blockchain in pinned to Ethereum
MainNet.
Posting Pins via a private blockchain significantly reduces
the cost of pinning, as only one blockchain needs to sub-
mit transactions to pin its state to Ethereum MainNet, and
sidechains can pin to that private blockchain. Doing this
reduces the number of transactions on Ethereum MainNet, thus
reducing congestion, and means that the cost of submitting
transactions is only incurred once for the private blockchain,
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rather than once for each sidechain.
A disadvantage of posting Pins via a private blockchain
is that participants of the sidechain need to observe and
be ready to challenge Pins being posted at each level of
the hierarchy. If sidechain state Pins are posted directly to
Ethereum MainNet, then the sidechain participants only need
to observe the pinning contract on Ethereum MainNet.
An additional benefit of pinning to a private blockchain is
that the chain’s permissioning could be set such that only
certain nodes could view the blockchain and only certain
accounts could submit transactions to the blockchain. Pinning
directly to Ethereum MainNet means that the organisation
pinning to the contract is public. If there is a dispute, then
masked participants will need to unmask themselves, and thus
link themselves to the sidechain and the other organisations
on the sidechain. If an intermediate blockchain was used, then
the pinning and any disputes could happen in a more private
setting.
C. Final State Pinning for Archiving
Final State Pinning is the same as State Pinning, with the
exception that rather than the pinning being on an ongoing
basis, it is just to pin the final state of a sidechain prior
to archiving, as described in Section IV-B. As such, the
advantages and disadvantages are similar to those described in
the previous section. As only one pin is posted, the concerns
over having to observe pins on a private blockchain in addition
to Ethereum MainNet are not significant as the observation is
for a single event. Similarly, concerns over cost of posting
pins to Ethereum MainNet and congestion are reduced. As
such, the advantages are reduced to the pin becoming final
sooner and the disadvantages are reduced to any dispute over
the value of the pin being public.
D. Sidechain Public Keys
As described in Section IV-F, the Atomic Crosschain Trans-
actions feature needs Sidechain Public Keys to be stored on a
Coordination Blockchain. The Sidechain Public Keys need to
be stored in a contract [5] that allows voting on new public
keys, and allows masked and unmasked participants. Given the
participants are the same as those for the pinning scheme, it
makes sense for these to be stored in the same contract as the
pinning information. Keeping the logic in the same contract
for pinning and holding the Sidechain Public Keys is useful
as it means that membership changes need to only occur in
one contract. However, the Sidechain Public Keys need to be
visible by all sidechains that wish to verify information coming
from the sidechain, whereas the pinning information need only
be visible by sidechain participants and government regulators
who would be appealed to in case of dispute.
Given the Sidechain Public Key is likely to be set once
only, the economic cost of storing the key is likely to only
be incurred once. No analysis of the gas cost of setting a
Sidechain Public Key has been undertaken yet. However, given
the small size of the public keys, 48 bytes, the incremental
gas cost of storing the public key is likely to be in the order of
60,000 Gas, assuming the voting infrastructure has already
been set-up. However, if the voting infrastructure did need to
be set-up, the gas cost could be much larger.
If a sidechain was short lived, then incurring the cost of
setting up the voting infrastructure and posting the Sidechain
Public Key to Ethereum MainNet could be deemed consid-
erable. However, if the sidechain was long lived, then this
relative cost might not be deemed as significant.
A disadvantage of using Ethereum MainNet to hold
Sidechain Public Keys is transactions take at least 12 blocks
before they should be deemed final (see Section III-C). This
means that, given a target block time of fourteen seconds,
users could not use the Sidechain Public Keys for Atomic
Crosschain Transactions for three minutes after the transaction
that posts the Sidechain Public Key is included in a block on
Etheurum MainNet.
E. Atomic Crosschain Transaction State
The Atomic Crosschain Transactions capability described
in Section IV-F uses a Crosschain Coordination Contract
to control when a crosschain transaction has started, been
committed, or should be ignored. This information need to
be available to all validators on all sidechains involved in the
crosschain transaction. The information in the contract needs
to be available until the last sidechain using the contract is
archived.
Storing the Atomic Crosschain State on Ethereum MainNet
means that each Atomic Crosschain Transaction costs money
to execute. This economic cost could be seen as an advantage,
as it provides an anti-spam control external to the sidechain
system. However, forcing enterprises to incur a cost for each
crosschain transaction is likely to be viewed as an unnecessary
cost.
Additional issues with storing the Atomic Crosschain State
on Ethereum MainNet is that this would leak the participants
of a sidechain, as a transaction would need to be submitted
linking the sidechain and the participant. Furthermore, this
would leak the rate that the participant was issuing crosschain
transactions.
In a similar way that storing Sidechain Public Keys on
Ethereum MainNet delays when the first Atomic Crosschain
Transaction can be issued, as discussed in Section V-D, storing
Atomic Crosschain Transaction State could delay the effective
start of each transaction. This is because sidechain participants
might want to wait for blocks that contain transactions that
indicate the Atomic Crosschain Transaction start to be final
prior to acting on the start indication.
VI. CONCLUSION
Coordination Blockchains perform various coordination
tasks in private blockchain systems. We used Ethereum Private
Sidechains as an exposition of such a system, highlighting the
features of Ethereum Private Sidechains and discussing each
feature’s need to leverage a Coordination Blockchain. Based
on the unique requirements of each feature and coordination
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activity, we examine whether public Ethereum MainNet would
be a suitable platform for each of those tasks.
We found that Ethereum Registration Authority smart con-
tracts of Ethereum Private Sidechains need to store long term
data that have to be available in a permissionless blockchain.
Ethereum MainNet would therefore be well suited to this task,
as it is a permissionless blockchain that incentivises good
behaviour using crypto economics, and provides good au-
thenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation properties. Ethereum
MainNet’s strong security properties are also useful for State
Pinning and in particular Final State Pinning, where the data
needs to be stored securely for long periods of time. However,
pinning directly to Ethereum MainNet could lead to congestion
on Ethereum MainNet, would incur high costs, and would
lead to the membership of a sidechain becoming public in
the case of a dispute over the value of a Pin. These issues are
significantly reduced by pinning via an intermediate private
blockchain. However, doing this introduces other issues, such
as participants having to observe pinned values at multiple
levels in the pinning hierarchy and the pinned values taking
longer to become final. Ethereum MainNet is not an appro-
priate location for Coordination Blockchain information that
needs to be final quickly, such as Sidechain Public Keys and
Atomic Crosschain Transaction State.
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